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# DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MANPOWER, FY 64-FY 77

THE COMPONENTS
OF CHANGE





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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APRIL 1975

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MANPOWER, FY 64 - FY 77

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THE COMPONENTS OF CHANGE



(Second Printing)

#### **FOREWORD**

This report has been prepared in response to a request by the Defense Manpower Commission for an explanation of changes in Department of Defense manpower from FY 1964 to FY 1977. The intent of this report is to provide a general explanation of major trends in DoD manpower during this period.

In preparing this report we were faced with two difficulties:

- Manpower increases and decreases were not routinely identified as being Southeast Asia related.
- There were numerous changes during this period in the accounting systems used to summarize manpower information.

For these reasons we were unable to develop an audit trail which accounts for all the changes in each manpower subcategory and we also recognize that the trends are somewhat contaminated by accounting changes. However, these deficiencies do not significantly affect the major manpower trends and the broad historical perspective presented in this report.

# CHANGES IN DEFENSE MANPOWER FY 64 - FY 77

The figure below shows the changes to DoD manpower which have occurred from FY 64 to FY 77. Strengths are measured at the ends of the respective fiscal years. The fiscal year will be from 1 October to 30 September starting with FY 77. A three-month transition period runs from 1 July 1976 to 30 September 1976 and is designated FY 7T. The Ready Reserve includes the Selected and Individual Ready Reserves. Standby and Retired Reserve personnel strengths are not shown on this chart, although they are assets available to DoD under certain emergency circumstances. Manpower devoted to the civil functions of DoD, youth programs, and certain other employees paid from nonappropriated funds are excluded from this paper. Table 1 contains the total DoD strength data supporting the charts in this first section.




Figure 1
DoD Manpower Strengths FY 64 - FY 77

This paper will provide a general explanation of the major changes and events which have taken place in the DoD manpower program since FY 64. It is not intended to be a detailed audit trail of the numerous separate actions which have occurred. Emphasis will be on broad trends. While not precise, these data are sufficiently accurate to present the basic components of change.

# MAJOR TRENDS IN DEFENSE MANPOWER FY 64 - FY 77

There are three major reasons for DoD manpower changes in this period:

...Southeast Asia (SEA) Increment. DoD Manpower increased from FY 64 to FY 68 due to the war in Vietnam. This buildup and the subsequent drawdown took place primarily in active military strength, although there was significant change in active civilian strength. Reserve strength was unaffected by this event, except for accumulation in the IRR as a consequence of the large active military strengths.

changed since FY 64, and those changes have affected the manpower program. Some manpower reductions can be directly attributed to force reductions; some manpower increases can be directly attributed to force increases. It is difficult, however, to separate all force related actions from other changes.

...Support Reductions. Some changes are the consequence of lower levels of support, either through improved utilization of manpower or elimination or reductions in support activities. While some support reductions are a consequence of management improvements, others simply reflect provision of less service. Some overall support reductions of particular interest are the following:

---Headquarters reductions

---Base closures

---Civilianization

It is difficult to measure the overall impact of support reductions, because there is some overlap when dealing with total numbers within this category. Some management actions, such as civilianization, are transfers from one form of DoD manpower to another (military to civilian). Some decreases may be attributed both to base closures and civilization. In addition, some bulk cuts were made by direction of the President or Congress and later allocated more or less arbitrarily to areas for implementation; while these are certainly support reductions, the extent to which they constitute management improvements is debatable.

## CHANGES IN DOD CIVILIAN STRENGTH

The figure below shows DoD direct hire and indirect hire civilian personnel for military functions from FY 64 to FY 77. As the number of US forces deployed overseas decreases, the number of indirect-hire civilians tends to decrease. The number of direct-hire civilians shows a SEA Increment of about 287,000 and a recent reduction of about 35,000 from the pre-war level. The FY 75 Congressional authorization of 995,000 direct-hire civilians is a major constraint on DoD civilian manpower.




Figure 2
DoD Civilian Manpower FY 64 - FY 77 (Military Functions)

DoD manpower programs must be analyzed under a Total Force approach, which considers <u>all</u> manpower resources - active military, reserve, and civilian - available to accomplish DoD missions. Military and civilian personnel work together to accomplish the purposes of DoD. It is fallacious to address military manpower apart from civilian manpower, as is often done. For example, the current civilian manpower program includes about 135,000 civilian spaces which are the result of the civilianization of military spaces over the past thirteen years. This report, however, will emphasize active military manpower.

# CHANGES IN THE READY RESERVE

Strength changes in the Ready Reserve are shown in the figure below. The strength of the Selected Reserve--primarily those reservists in force structure units who are receiving drill pay--has changed little over the past 13 years. During this period, however, the structure or wartime strength of the Selected Reserve has been reduced from about two million to just over one million. Thus, the Selected Reserve has been transformed from numerous units manned at about half-strength to fewer units manned at about 90% of their wartime authorizations.




Figure 3 Ready Reserve Strength, FY 64 - FY 77

During this period the strength of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) was simply a consequence of the changing strength of the active military forces. The IRR provides individual fillers to bring active and selected reserve units to wartime strength, fill the unmanned units, and replace initial combat losses. Accessions to the IRR are for the most part generated by people serving out their residual obligation after completing active service. Thus, the IRR strength trends follow active strength trends with a lag of about two years, as shown in the figure.

Changes in Ready Reserve will not be addressed further in this paper.

# CHANGES IN ACTIVE MILITARY STRENGTHS

Emphasis in this report will be on understanding and explaining the changes in active duty military strength which occur from end FY 64 to end FY 77. The figure below shows these changes by Military Service:




Figure 4 Active Military Strengths by Military Service, FY 64 - FY 77

Breakdown of military strengths into the components of change will be accomplished as follows:

--- A datum for measurement of changes will be established.

---The SEA Increment will be computed, and the non-SEA manpower program - that program which would have happened in the absence of a war in Vietnam - will be derived.

 $\operatorname{\mathsf{---The}}$  direct effects of force structure changes will be estimated.

#### ESTABLISHMENT OF BASELINE

In order to provide a measure of the reductions and changes which have taken place in DoD manpower over the past 13 years, it is necessary to establish a baseline. The baseline itself is arbitrary and serves mainly as a point from which to measure changes. In this case, the baseline has been chosen to be the strengths that existed on 30 June 1964. The significance of this baseline is that it represents DoD strength prior to the Vietnam buildup. Thus, it serves as a reference point from which to measure both that buildup and changes which have occurred post-Vietnam. The effect of this baseline when applied to active military strength is shown in the figure below:




Figure 5
Active Military Strengths Compared to FY 64 Baseline

Using the baseline as a reference, an initial estimate of the effect of the Vietnam war on active military manpower is shown in the shaded areas. The first shaded area shows the SEA increment. Military strength increased about 860,000 for the Vietnam War and decreased the same amount by June 1971 to reach the pre-war level. The second shaded area represents reductions from the FY 64 baseline, or real reductions from the pre-war situation. It is more accurate, however, to recognize that some of the force changes and management improvements would have taken place even if the Vietnam War had not occurred. The next essential step is to establish the effects of that war.

# COMPUTATION OF THE SEA INCREMENT

The hypothesis of this section is that the changes in manpower occurring during the buildup for the war in Vietnam were the result of the demands of that war. These changes are termed the SEA Increment, or that portion of the manpower program which would not have existed in the absence of the war in Vietnam. The SEA Increment does not purport to be the total manpower engaged in the support of the war, either directly or indirectly; total manpower in support of the war is a much larger number than the SEA Increment. The difference between total DoD manpower and the SEA Increment is the Adjusted DoD manpower program which would have existed if the war in Vietnam had not happened. Data supporting the computation of the SEA Increment are in Table 2.

There are two elements to the SEA Increment, and a different method is used to measure each:

---The Pacific Theater Increment is based on strength in the Pacific Theater, exclusive of Hawaii; it provides a measure of the direct support of the war in the theater of operations. Figure 6 shows active military manpower in the Pacific Theater (excluding Hawaii) from FY 64 to FY 77. The increase over pre-war deployments is shown in the top shaded area; the maximum in-theater increase for Vietnam over the FY 64 strength was 622,000. However, the programmed strength in the same area for end FY 77 is 91,000 less than the pre-war level, and this represents post-SEA reductions in the Pacific Theater deployments.

---The Base Increment is based on strength in the United States; it provides a measure of the general support of the war effort. Figure 7 shows the active military strength in the United States from FY 64 to FY 77. The strength above the FY 64 Baseline strength is attributed to additional support needed for the war in Southeast Asia. The FY 64 strength included provision for support of U.S. forces worldwide and was not provided primarily for support of SEA. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that an increase above the FY 64 levels could be attributed to SEA support. After the end of the SEA war the strength in the United States decreased below the FY 64 levels. These reductions are attributed to force changes and management improvements.

These figures also show that although for comparison purposes we may use the FY 64 number as a base, we should not attribute an exact meaning to the date at which this same number was again reached. Thus, the Pacific Theater Increment goes to zero in mid-FY 72, whereas the Base Increment goes to zero in mid-FY 70.




Figure 6
Active Military Strength in Pacific Theater (Excluding Hawaii)
FY 64 - FY 77




Figure 7
Active Military Strength in the United States, FY 64 - FY 77

The net effect of the SEA Increment and the SEA Base Increment constitutes the SEA Increment. This is shown in the figure below:




Figure 8
Active Military Strength FY 64 - FY 77
Showing SEA Increment and Adjusted DoD Manpower Program

There is no way of knowing, of course, what the DoD strength actually would have been without a war. However, the Adjusted DoD Strength is an approximation of the strength of DoD if the SEA war had not occurred.

The difference between the FY 64 Baseline and the DoD Adjusted Strength is the net reduction from FY 64 after the effects of the Vietnam war have been taken out. This difference results from either force changes or management improvements. During the period FY 67 to FY 72 DoD was applying resources to the support of SEA which were obtained within the total DoD strength by conversion from other missions. That is, force changes and support reductions were taking place in this period which allowed more effort to go to support the war than simply the excess over the FY 64 Baseline. While it is also true that force reductions (e.g., Strategic Forces cuts) and support reductions were going on during the buildup period from FY 64 to FY 68, the effects of the massive buildup for Vietnam overwhelm the other effects, and it is very difficult to derive the components of change for the buildup period. Similarly, it is difficult to separate the force changes relating to SEA from force changes not relating to SEA during the period of reduction from FY 68 to FY 72. During this reduction period, from FY 68-FY 72, however, it is possible to attribute at least 90,000 reductions to support reductions.




Figure 9
Adjusted DoD Active Military Strength Compared to the FY 64 Baseline

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#### FORCE CHANGES FY 64-FY 77

The next step in explaining changes in DoD manpower from FY 64 to FY 77 is to determine what manpower changes resulted from force structure changes. That is, what has been the impact on manpower of more or fewer aircraft, ships, or battalions? This is not very easy because force changes cause both direct and indirect manpower changes. When an aircraft carrier is eliminated, the deduction of the carrier's crew from the manpower program is a direct change and can be accounted for. However, the elimination of an aircraft carrier also has effects on the training establishment, shore bases, and even personnel activities, and these indirect changes are difficult to account for because there are so many small actions which produce the final result. This section will deal only with the direct effects of force structure changes.

The method of this section will be to examine the force structure changes that have occurred in each of the five Defense Planning and Programming categories which are major mission forces: Strategic Forces, Land Forces, Tactical Air Forces, Naval Forces, and Mobility Forces. Force structure changes which have occurred or are programmed to occur over the thirteen year period will be listed. Manpower strengths will also be listed. Some correlation between the force changes and the manpower changes will be sought. This examination of forces and manpower will be done in a Total Force context: active military, active civilian, and selected reserve manpower will all be considered. The major emphasis, however, will be on explaining the overall changes in active military manpower.

During the period FY 64 to FY 77:

- ---Strategic Forces total manpower decreases by over 50% as manned bombers and CONUS air defense are reduced while ICBM and SLBM increase then level off.
- ---Land Forces total manpower attains its pre-war totals by FY 77, although there is a slight shift from active to reserve manpower
- ---Tactical Air Forces total manpower and active manpower increases while there is a decrease in the number of active aircraft and shift of aircraft to the reserves.
- ---Naval Forces total manpower decreases by around 20% accompanied by a significant decrease in the number of naval ships.
- ---Mobility Forces total manpower decreases slightly as older aircraft are eliminated and the number of aircraft and ships goes down.

## CHANGES IN STRATEGIC FORCES MANPOWER

Figure 10 below shows the changes that occur in Strategic Forces manpower from FY 64 to FY 77. (The data to support this and other similar figures in this section are contained in Table 3.) Figure 11 shows force structure data for selected key years in the period of interest.




Figure 10
Strategic Forces Active Military Strengths, FY 64 - FY 77

Major force changes which affected Strategic Forces manpower are:

---Reduction in CONUS air and missile defense capability with a corresponding change in mission to peacetime airspace control and warning and surveillance. This involves a reduction of 830 active and 500 reserve interceptor aircraft and 143 active and reserve surface-to-air missile batteries.

--- Reduction of about 700 manned bombers.

---Modernization and stabilization of the tanker fleet with a slight reduction in numbers and transfer of some tankers to the reserves.

---Increases in the strategic missile force of about 300 ICBM and 330 SLBM.

#### FORCE CHANGES

STRATEGIC FORCES	FY 64	FY 68	FY 74	FY 76	FY 77
ICBM	708	1,054	1,054	1,054	1,054
SLBM	336	656	656	656	656
Bombers (TAI)*	1,277	648	500	497	495
Tankers (TAI)* Active Reserve	902	677	656	628 32	588 72
Interceptors (TAI)* Active Reserve	952 591	579 444	167 391	139 169	134 90
SAM Batteries Active & Reserve	147	123	1	1	_

<sup>\*</sup>Total Active Inventory is the sum of aircraft in units; used for combat crew training, research and development, and command support; and held in special storage.

Figure 11 Strategic Forces Changes, FY 64 - FY 77

There is no doubt that the reductions in certain elements of the Strategic Forces have caused the direct reductions in manpower shown in Figure 10. Reductions in numbers of forces have not, however, necessarily caused a corresponding decrease in capability. The two areas for major reductions are CONUS air defense and manned bombers. The value of a large number of forces for the defense of CONUS in the 1970s is considerably less than it formerly was and these units became of marginal value as DoD budgets declined in real value post-Vietnam. The reduction in manned bombers occurred as alternative means of fulfilling the nuclear offensive mission became more capable and older bomber types were phased out. The overall strategic offensive capability, however, increased during this period in terms of ability to defeat Soviet targets. Finally, the forces in this category are basically stabilized at their present levels by the arms limitations agreements reached between the US and the USSR in recent years.

# CHANGES IN LAND FORCES MANPOWER

Figure 12 shows Land Forces manpower changes from FY 64 to FY 77. Figure 13 shows changes in the combined arms organizations of the Land Forces from FY 64 to FY 77. Figure 14 shows the relationship of Land Forces manpower to total maneuver battalions.




Figure 12 Land Forces Strengths, FY 64-FY 77

The total Land Forces strength has regained its FY 64 level by end FY 77; however, there has been a shift of about 50,000 spaces from the active to the reserve component. The Land Forces initially dropped from their pre-war levels as active Army strength was reduced drastically post-Vietnam, and FY 72 levels were about 25% below the pre-war levels. However, by improved manpower management, manpower strength stabilization, and increased integration of active and reserve components, the DoD Land Forces are programmed to regain their pre-war levels although total active Army manpower will be about 180,000 less than in FY 64. This effect is highlighted in Figure 13 which shows total Land Forces manpower plotted against total infantry and tank battalions. Not only have the pre-war manpower levels been regained, but post-war capability, as measured by these battalions, is higher than was the case in FY 64. The FY 77 force appears to be a more efficient as well as a stronger force.

LAND FORCES	FY 64	Y 68	FY 74	FY 76	FY 77
Combined Arms Organizations					
Divisions					
Active	19	23	16	19	19
Reserve	$\frac{30}{49} \frac{1}{}$	$\frac{9}{32}$	9	9	$\frac{9}{28}$
Total	49	32	25	28	28
Separate Brigades					
Active	5	6	4	3	3
Reserve	11 1/	20	20	20	20
Total	$\frac{11}{16} \frac{1}{1}$	$\frac{20}{26}$	$\frac{20}{24}$	$\frac{20}{23}$	$\frac{20}{23}$
Cavalry Regiments					
Active	4	5	3	4	4
Reserve	3	4	4	4	4
Total	7	9	7	8	8

1/ These reserve divisions and brigades were understrength and underequipped.

Figure 13 Land Forces Changes, FY 64 - FY 77




Figure 14 Land Forces Maneuver Battalions, FY 64 - FY 77

# CHANGES IN TACTICAL AIR FORCES MANPOWER

Figure 15 shows changes in tactical air forces manpower from FY 64 to FY 77. Figure 16 summarizes the changes which have taken place in Tactical Air Force aircraft from FY 64 to FY 77. Figure 17 shows in graphic form the trend in unit equipment tactical air aircraft by component.




Figure 15 Tactical Air Forces Strengths, FY 64-FY 77

Tactical Air Forces manpower has increased both in active military strength and total strength since FY 64. This occurred along with reduction of about 850 aircraft overall and a shift of about 250 aircraft from the active to reserve component. Numbers of supplemental mission aircraft, such as tankers, Electronic-counter Measures, Airborne Early Warning, and Special Mission Forces aircraft have increased during the period. The reductions have occurred in the reconnaissance and fighter/attack aircraft. In addition, two of 15 attack aircraft carriers are being eliminated. The overall effect is illustrated by the plot in Figure 17 of total tactical aircraft. This is not the whole story, however, because the aircraft of FY 77 are bigger and more capable, and require more support manpower, than did the aircraft of the pre-Vietnam era. In addition, the previous forces contained large numbers of obsolescent aircraft types, particularly in the reserve components. The reduction of 600 aircraft in the reserves is primarily the result of purging these older aircraft from the force. Overall capability, therefore, has increased generally in accordance with the increase in manpower.

TACTICAL AIR FORCES	FY 64	FY 68	FY 74	FY 76	FY 77
Tactical Aircraft (UE)* Active Reserve Total	3,578	5,184	3,438	3,369	3,314
	2,119	1,506	1,437	1,513	1,525
	5,697	6,690	4,875	4,882	4,839
Fighter/Attack Aircraft (UE)* Active Reserve Total	2,936	3,617	2,693	2,706	2,676
	1,368	889	940	979	1,015
	4,367	4,506	3,633	3,685	3,691
Reconnaissance Aircraft (UE)* Active Reserve Total	228	482	297	229	225
	<u>457</u>	305	135	170	170
	685	787	432	399	395
Other Aircraft (UE)* 1/ Active Reserve Total	414	1,085	448	434	413
	294	372	362	364	340
	708	1,457	810	798	753
Attack Carriers	15	15	14	13	13

\* Unit Equipment aircraft are those assigned to squadrons.

1/ Includes tankers, airborne early-warning, electronic countermeasures, special operations forces, and other aircraft types.

Figure 16
Tactical Air Forces Changes, FY 64 - FY 77




Figure 17 Tactical Air Forces Aircraft, FY 64 - FY 77

## CHANGES IN NAVAL FORCES MANPOWER

Figure 18, below, shows changes in Naval Forces manpower from FY 64 to FY 77. Figure 20, opposite, shows corresponding changes in Naval Forces.




Figure 18 Naval Forces Strengths, FY 64-FY 77

The Naval Forces and associated manpower have dropped appreciably from pre-war levels. As shown in the table below, total ships have been reduced by over 360 ships (about 40%) during the period, primarily by retiring old, obsolescent WW II-era ships. This has been partially compensated for by larger, and more modern ships, but the reduction is nonetheless real.

	FY 64	FY 68	FY 74	FY 76	FY 77
Number of Ships $\underline{1}/$	874	922	504	490	511
Change from FY 64	0	+48	-370	-384	-363

<sup>1</sup>/ Excludes patrol combatants (16 in FY 77) and smaller craft, such as those in the coastal/riverine warfare forces.

Figure 19
Total Ships in Naval Forces, FY 64-FY 77

# FORCE CHANGES

NAVAL FORCES	FY 64	FY 68	FY 74	FY 76	FY 77
ASW Carriers	9	8	-	-	-
ASW Aircraft (UE)					
Active Reserve Total	583 314 897	548 256 804	361 164 525	464 148 612	472 166 638
Attack Submarines	112	114	73	78	82
Major Surface Combatants					
Active Fleet Cruisers Destroyers/Frigates Total Active	34 239 273	37 262 299	28 133 161	28 140 168	30 151 181
Reserve Fleet Destroyers/Frigates Total Surface Combatants	40 313	35 334	37 198	30 198	30 211
Amphibious Lift Ships					
Active Reserve Total	133 - 133	157 - 157	65 - 65	63 3 66	65 3 68
Mine Countermeasure Ships					
Active Fleet Reserve Fleet Total	84 13 97	84 12 96	9 25 34	3 22 25	3 22 25
Underway Replenishment Ships					,
Active Fleet Military Sealift Command Total	72 - 72	75 - 75	49 3 52	41 9 50	41 9 50
Support Ships					
Active Fleet Military Sealift Total	137 1 138	135 3 138	74 8 82	64 9 73	64 11 75

Figure 20 Naval Forces Changes, FY 64-FY 77




Figure 21 Naval Forces, FY 64-FY 77

Figure 21 is a plot of trends in Naval Forces total manpower, ASW aircrewmen billets, and ship displacement tonnage as functions of time. In the case of ships, full-load displacement tonnage is considered to be a much better indicator than numbers of ships for relating manpower required. A comparison of Figure 21 with Figures 19 and 20 shows that, while the numbers of ships will have declined 40 percent, the displacement tonnage will have declined only 23 percent. In short, the trend has been toward fewer but larger ships. At the same time, other force level trends, such as that indicated for airborne ASW by the aircrewmen billets shown, have remained relatively constant over the period in question. Ships and ASW aircraft either directly or indirectly form the primary basis for Naval Forces manpower requirements, and Figure 21 shows that the decline in total manpower is commensurate with the trends in these forces.

# CHANGES IN MOBILITY FORCES MANPOWER

Figure 22 shows changes in Mobility Forces manpower from FY 64 to FY 77. Figures 23, 24, and 25 illustrate force structure changes in Mobility Forces.




Figure 22 Mobility Forces Strengths, FY 64-FY 77

The manpower reduction in Mobility Forces has been relatively small, but there have been numerous changes in the forces. Since FY 64, a new fleet of strategic airlift aircraft (the C5A and C141) has been added. There has been a massive reduction in older types of tactical airlift and a stabilization of tactical airlift force levels with the C-130 as the basic aircraft. The number of strategic and tactical airlift aircraft has decreased drastically, and the post-war level is only about one-half of the pre-war level. Overall airlift capacity, however, has increased, as shown in Figure 24, which plots numbers of unit equipment aircraft and ton miles per day. From FY 64 to FY 77 the capacity of the airlift fleet has doubled.

# FORCE CHANGES

MOBILITY FORCES	FY 64	FY 68	FY 74	FY 76	FY 77
Strategic Airlift Aircraft C5A (TAI) C141 (AAI)	<del>-</del> 6 -	- 266	79 275	78 275	78 275
Tactical Airlift Aircraft (AAAActive C130 Other Total Reserve	506 804 1,310	502 468 970	327 87 414	283 87 370	283 32 315
C130 Other Total C130 Other Total	927 927 506 1,731 2,237	710 718 510 1,178 1,688	220 194 414 547 281 828	288 153 441 571 240 811	290 123 413 573 155 728
Sealift Ships Active, In Comm Tankers Cargo Other Total Controlled Charters	25 38 38 101	26 41 <u>63</u> 130	16 12 - 28	7 12 	7 11 
Tankers Cargo Total Total Active Ships	- <u>-</u> 101	- - - 130	5 1 6 34	14 1 15 34	14 1 15 33
National Def Res Fleet	255	490	130	130	130
Logistical Helicopters Active Reserve Total	78 - 78	642 - 642	558 161 719	530 163 693	530 163 693

Figure 23 Mobility Forces Changes, FY 64-FY 77




Figure 24
Strategic & Tactical Airlift Aircraft & Capacity, FY 64-FY 77

Sealift capacity, on the other hand, has decreased dramatically during the period. Figure 25 shows capacities for dry cargo ships, tankers, and passengers ships from FY 64 to FY 77 for those ships under DoD control - either DoD owned or under long-term charter. Passenger capacity and dry cargo capacity decrease and this kind of passenger sealift capacity disappeared in FY 74. Tanker capacity increases, although the number of tankers goes from 22 in FY 64 to 12 in FY 77. It should be noted that DoD has agreement to use about 400 commercial ships and about 300 NATO ships in time of war.




Figure 25 Sealift Capacity, FY 64-FY 77

## CHANGES IN MAJOR MISSION FORCES

Figure 25 illustrates the changes in manpower in the major mission force categories from FY 64 to FY 77. The top strength line is for total manpower - active, civilian, and selected reserve. Compared to the FY 64 Baseline, the FY 77 program reduces major mission category total manpower by 216,000 spaces. The second strength line shows active military strength in the major mission categories. When compared to the FY 64 Baseline for active military strength, the reduction from FY 64 to FY 77 is 215,000 spaces. Almost the entire reduction in major mission categories can be attributed to reductions in active strengths.




Figure 26
Major Mission Forces Manpower, FY 64-FY 77

For active military manpower, the portion of major mission forces strength below the FY 64 Baseline is assumed to be attributable to force changes. The difference between the FY 64 Baseline and the total in major mission categories is the component of change due to force changes. For FY 77 this component of change is 215,000 spaces. In the next section the changes due to all other reasons, which we have termed "support reductions" will be examined.

## SUPPORT REDUCTIONS

As indicated earlier, this category is a general one, used as a convenient way to discuss these changes in defense manpower not directly attributable to the Southeast Asia drawdown or to force changes. Among the programs which have received considerable attention recently are headquarters reductions, base closures, and civilianization. Many of these changes, particularly in the Auxiliary Forces, are simply the result of providing a lower level of output for a particular support function. Changes in the Auxiliary Forces, Mission Support Forces, Central Support Forces, and the Individuals accounts are presented in this section.

# CHANGES IN AUXILIARY FORCES MANPOWER

By the nature of the supportive activities that they conduct, Auxiliary Forces tend to increase or decrease depending on the projected workload for these missions to be accomplished. The FY 77 level will be 70,000 military spaces and 23,000 civilian spaces below FY 64. Figure 27 shows this trend.




Figure 27 Auxiliary Forces Strengths, FY 64-FY 77

Most of the decline since has occurred in the Intelligence and Security and Communications categories. Support to Other Nations has also declined with recent reductions in military assistance activities. On the other hand, Research and Development and Geophysical activities have tended to remain relatively stable.

## CHANGES IN MISSION SUPPORT FORCES MANPOWER

Mission Support Forces have sustained considerable reductions during the period under study, as shown in Figure 28. Military manpower in FY 77 will be 209,000 less than FY 64 and civilian manpower 19,000 less. Two categories, Reserve Components Support and Force Training, have remained relatively stable, so most of the changes are in Base Operating Support and Command.




Figure 28 Mission Support Forces Strengths, FY 64-FY 77

Base Operating Support reductions are 75,000 military spaces and 32,000 civilian spaces between FY 71 and FY 77. One activity that has contributed to these reductions has been base closures.

# CHANGES IN CENTRAL SUPPORT MANPOWER

Figure 29 is a plot of recorded strengths in the Central Support Category. These data appear to show a very large decrease in Central Support manpower, with a dramatic drop in FY 72. This is misleading, however, and is largely attributable to a change in the DPP accounting system. Prior to FY 72, Trainees and Students were included as part of the Training category, but this was changed when the Individuals account was increased to include Trainees and Students.




Figure 29 Central Support Forces Strengths, FY 64-FY 77

Figure 30 shows what the trends would have been if the Trainees and Students had remained a part of Central Support Forces. The FY 77 level is somewhat lower than FY 64, but not nearly so much as it appeared in Figure 29.




Figure 30
Central Support Forces Strengths, FY 64-FY 77
(Showing Adjusted Totals for FY 72-FY 77)

Between FY 72 and FY 77 there is a programmed reduction of about 70,000 military spaces. The two categories of greatest decrease are Individual Training and Command. The former is attributable to the decreasing requirement for training new accessions as the force stabilizes and the latter is partially related to headquarters reductions which is discussed subsequently.

## THE INDIVIDUALS ACCOUNT

Military manpower authorizations in each of the Services are of two types: force structure allowance and individuals. As used in the earlier sections of this report, "forces" means some kind of a "structure" - an organized cluster of jobs based on the mission and manning criteria of a unit. In order to keep the units manned at their authorized strengths, each Service has a set of Individuals accounts. These consist of transients, patients, prisoners, trainees, students and service academy cadets. An important difference between force structure manpower spaces and individuals is that while the structure may be planned in advance, Individual accounts can only be estimated, based on historical data and planning factors.

As mentioned above, there was a substantial change in FY 72, when Trainees and Students, previously part of Central Support Forces, was added to the Individuals account. Figure 31 shows the trend of Individuals with the dotted line indicating what the total would have been without the accounting change. In FY 64, the Individuals account was three percent of total DoD manpower; in FY 77, on the old basis, it would be about five percent.




Figure 31 Individuals, FY 64 - FY 77 (Showing Adjusted Totals for FY 72 - FY 77)

### CIVILIANIZATION

The DoD has had a longstanding policy of utilizing civilian employees in any position that does not specifically require a military incumbent (DoD Directive 1400.5). In a concentrated civilianization program during 1966 to 1968, 95,000 civilian personnel were placed in formerly military positions in order to free military personnel for operations in Southeast Asia. The routine application of the policy during the period of phase down resulted in an increase of the proportion of civilians to total DoD manpower from 30% in January 1969 to 33% in June 1973.

Further impetus was given to civilianization efforts by Senate Armed Services and House Appropriations Committee reports for FY 73 which directed the DoD to conduct a thorough analysis of civilian substitution potential. Since that time, 48,000 military spaces have been eliminated and 40,000 civilian spaces added as shown in Figure 32.




Figure 32
Department of Defense Civilianization Program
FY 1973 - FY 1975
End of Fiscal Year

These changes cannot be related directly to individual DPP categories but civilianization has contributed to the overall reduction of military spaces in the support area.

	Accor	nplished Du			
	FY 73	FY 74	1st Half FY 75	Total 31 Dec 74	Goal 30 Jun 75
Army	519	9,096	1,502	11,117	14,078
Navy	209	9,016	647	9,872	10,000
Marine Corps	27	962	3	992	1,194
Air Force	883	8,470	1,970	11,323	14,078
Defense Agencies	19	153	214	386	670
Total	1,657	27,697	4,336	33,690	40,020

Figure 33 Civilianization FY 73-75

# HEADQUARTERS REDUCTIONS

Similarly, considerable attention has been given recently to reductions in major headquarters activities. Headquarters in four major areas are under review:

- the Military Departments
- the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
  - the Defense Agencies

Figure 34 shows progress in headquarters reductions in each of the above categories from FY 71 to date.

	FY 71 thru 1/	Plar	nned	Total FY 71 to
	FY 74	FY 75	FY 76	FY 76
OSD/OJCS	(+70)	400	0	330
Unified Commands	900	1,000	0	1,900
Army	6,500	7,100	0	13,600
Navy	5,500	1,600	0	7,100
Marine Corps	900	500	0	1,400
Air Force	7,600	6,300	2,000	15,900
Defense Agencies 2/	300	5,400	1,300	7,000
Totals	21,630	22,300	3,300	47,230

- $\frac{1}{2}$ / Estimated.  $\frac{1}{2}$ / Includes all operating activities.

Figure 34 DoD Headquarters Review Progress in Headquarters Reductions Military and Civilian Strengths

Many of these manpower reductions are being reallocated to improve the strength and readiness of combat forces. Thus, the two major benefits of the headquarters review are improvement in the combat-to-support ratio and improvement in defense management.

## ACTIVE MILITARY MANPOWER COMPONENTS OF CHANGE

Once the effects of the war in Vietnam have been excluded by the method used earlier in this paper, it is possible to separate the changes in active military manpower from FY 64 to FY 77 into two components of change as shown on Figure 35. Those manpower changes which can be attributed to increases, decreases, or adjustments in the major mission categories are shown as force changes. Force changes account for 215,000 spaces of the difference between the FY 64 Baseline and the End FY 77 program. The manpower changes in the mission support categories (including individuals) are attributed to support reductions. Support reductions total 346,000 spaces from FY 64 to FY 77. Of this total of 346,000 spaces, 64,000 were converted into increased forces, measured from the low point in mission forces at end FY 74. The remaining 282,000 spaces reduced by decreasing support were simply taken out of the active military strength.




Figure 35
Active Military Strength
Components of Change, FY 64-FY 77

As a result of these overall changes, the balance in the DoD active military manpower program between those spaces in the mission categories and those spaces in the support categories (including individuals) has shifted toward more mission forces. This is shown in Figure 36.




Figure 36
Major Mission Forces as a
Percent of Active Military Manpower FY 64-FY 77

To the extent that a division between major mission forces and support forces is a valid indicator of efficiency (and that is questionable), the data show that the DoD is better organized in FY 77 than it was in FY 64. At least, the percentage of active military manpower in mission forces has increased from 47.3% in FY 64 to 49.6% in FY 77. This conclusion, of course, must remain tentative until the civilian and selected reserve manpower data can be treated in the same manner as the active military strength.

### CONCLUDING REMARKS

A reasonable explanation of the changes that have taken place or are programmed to take place in DoD manpower from FY 64 to FY 77 is difficult to achieve. This report does provide an explanation which is accurate in general terms but which probably suffers from inaccuracy in detail. Several basic simplifying assumptions are used in the report, and some of these are somewhat misleading, but they are necessary to allow any explanation at all. The data need to be checked to assure that they mean what they are supposed to mean. Support reductions improvements from FY 64 to FY 72 need to be researched and brought to light, for the present method does not account for them. With all of its admitted faults, however, this report does show in relatively simple terms the general components of change which affect DoD manpower during the period FY 64 to FY 77.

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- Table 1. <u>DoD Manpower, FY 64-FY 77,</u> by Type of Manpower (active military, civilian, reserve military) and DoD Component
- Table 2. Computation of SEA Increment, for active military manpower
- Table 3. DoD Manpower by Major Defense Planning and Programming Category, FY 64-FY 77 by active military, selected reserve, and civilian manpower
- Table 4. Major Mission Forces Manpower, FY 64-FY 77 by active military, civilian, and selected reserve strengths
- Table 5. DoD Active Military Manpower by Defense Planning and Programming Category, FY 64-FY 77, showing percentage of total
- NOTE: Tables 1 and 3 may not completely agree for some years because historical adjustments made to major time series by Service totals are not available by DPP Category.

TABLE 1. DOD	MAND	OWED	EV	64	EV	77
	1,3623.43	UNDER	1.1	234		

		TABLE 1, 000	MANPOWER, FY 6	4 - FY 77	Civi	line
		Active 1/	Selected	Individual Ready	Direct 27	Indirect
	Total	Duty	Reserve	Reserve	Hire	Hire
			June 1964			
Total DoD Army	5,660,076 7,536,751	2,685,161 972,445	953,256 650,070	845,886 461,007	1,335,463	140,310 93,260
Navy Marine Corps	1,347,890 293,454	972,445 667,163 189,751	123,277 45,860	210,412 52,843	332,678	14,360
Air Force	1,474,185	855,802	134,049	116,624	305,020	32,690
Other Defense Activities	37,796				37,796	
			June 1965			
Total DoD	5.622,610 2,514,908	2,653,142	932,469	369,038	1,037,520	130,451
Anny Navy	2,514,908 1,344,653	968,313 671,009	932,469 640,665	463,754 203,492	355.475 333.271	86.701 13,393
Marine Corps Air Force	290,377		123,488 45,618	54,572		
Other Defense	1,430,404	823,633	122,698	147,220	306,496	
Activities	42,278				. 42,278	
			June 1966			
Total DoD Army	6,327,330 2,902,553	3,091,552 1,199,046	969,188 671,898	996,433	1,141,603	128,549 85,489
Navv	1,452,004	744,469	123,803	552,179 213,350	356,244	13,638
Marine Corps Air Force	376.738 1,527.095	261,687 886,350	48,593 124,894	66,45E 164,451	321,911	29,489
Other Defense Activities	68,940				68,927	
			June 1967			
Total DoD	6,665,597	3,376,511	982,670	ugn one	1,305,850	
Army	3,122,497	1,442,422	680.031	880,226 446,695	473.067	120,340 80,282
Navy Marine Corps	1,519,812	751,394 285,269	125,058 47,558	219,793 55,983	409.942	13,625
Air Force Other Defense	1,555,330	897,426	130,023	55.983 157.755	343,707	26,419
Activities	79,148				79,134	7.4
			June 1968			
Total DoD	6,943,835	3.547.429	922,318 633,421	1,068,286	1,286,740	119,062
Army Navv	3,375,650	1,570,186	633,421 123,904	630,853 204,263	461,632 419,646	79,558
Marine Corps Air Force	1,526,759 438,747 1,527,721	765,232 307,252 904,759	46,685 118,308	85,050 148,120		
Other Defense		700×700	110,308	346.340	330,356	25,678
Activities	74,718				74,706	
			June 1969			
Total DoD Army	7,164,476 3,513,417	3,469,423	960,404	1,344,292	1,275,540 455,648	114,017
Navy	1,580,231	1,511,946 775,644	650,276 132,710	819,379 234,304	423,979	76.168 13.594
Marine Corps Air Force	468,227 1,520,895	309,771 862,062	49,078	109,378	324,379	24,883
Other Defense Activities	21,706				71,534	
			June 1970			
Total Dod	6,904,239	3,065,50R	987,267		1,161,405	
Army Navy	3,405,210	1.327.259	EEQ RAA	932,462 297,773	410,004 376,340	89,650
Martine Coyps	1,506,691 455,054		128,381	146,143		
Air Force Other Detense	1,470,363		141,056		106.319	
Activities	67,921				67.752	
			June 1921			
Total DoD Army	6,475,226 1,734,612	2,713,891	970,400 665,474		1,094,209	96,219 65,312
Navy Marine Corps	1,394,878	1,128,482 673,073 212,369	130,041 47,006	992,321 180,308 124,677		
	384,052 1,393,668		135,879	195,201		19,434
Other Defense Activities	61,016				62,881	165
Total DoB			924,557		1,067,506	
	2,939,671	2,322,139 810,649	622,731	1,069,909	367,356 341,543	
Navy Marine Corps	1,280,097 377,188 1,317,155		124,098	139,214		
	1,337,155	725,635	136,997			
Activities.	60.811					96
			June 1973			
Total DoD	5,499,621	2,251,928	918,970	1,228,741	998,033	101,949
	2,585,861 1,241,766	800,523 564,308	621,099 126,206		133,235	12,218
Navy Marine Corps	349,564	196,098	37,509 134,156		270,484	
Air Force Other Defense	1,249,498	690,999	134,156			
Activities	72,932				72,549	
			June 1974			
Total DoD	5,127,126 2,370,591	2,161,162	926.148		1,014,014	94,480
Army Navy	1,174,583	782,897 545,668	114, 64	540,787 178,904	342,191 323,556	66,459 11,591
Marine Corps Air Force	311,264 1,195,403	188,802 643,795	32,860 140,222	89,662 121,974	273,596	15,816
Other Defense	1,133,403	Calabia Carana Carana	The state of the s		Consulation leaders	

Total DoD Army	6,665,597 3,122,497	3,376,511	982,670	880,226	1,305,850	120,340
Navy	1,519,812	1,442,422 751,394	680,031 125,058	446,695 219,793	473,067 409,942	80,282 13,625
Marine Corps Air Force	388,810 1,555,330	285,269 897,426	47,558 130,023	55,983 157,755	343,707	26.419
Other Defense Activities	79,148				79,134	14
			June 1968		77,134	14
Total DoD	6.943.835	3,547,429	922,318	1,068,286	1,286,740	119.062
Army Navy	3,375,650 1,526,759 438,787	1,570,186	633,421 123,904	630,853 204,263	461,637 419,546	79,558
Marine Corps Air Force	1.527.721	765,232 307,262 904,759	46.685 118.308	85,050 148,120	330,756	25,678
Other Defense Activities	74,718		110,500	140,120		
	14,010		June 1969		74,706	
Total DoD	7,154,476	3,459,423	960,404	1,344,292	1,275,640	114,817
Army Navy	3,513,417 1,580,231	1,511,948 775,644	650.276 132.710	819,379	455,648	
Marine Lorps	468,227		49.078	234,304 109,378	423,979	13,594
Air Force Other Defense		862,062	123,340	181,231	374,379	24,003
Activities	71.706					
			June 1970			
	6,904,739	3,065,508	987,297	1,587,115	1.161.405	
Navy	3,405,210 1,506,691	1,322,758 692,435	669,846 178,331	932,462 297,771	410,994 376,340	
Marine Corps Air Force	455,054 1,470,383		48,974 141,056	146,343 210,537		
Other Defense Activities	67,971					
			June 1971			
Total DoD	6,475,226	2,713,891	978,400		1,094,209	or 515
Army	3,234,612	1,123,482	666-474			96,219 65,312
Navy Marine Corps	1.194,878 384,052	623.023 212.369	130,041 47,006	280,308 124,677	350,198	
Air Force Other Detense	1,393,668	755,017	135,879	195,201	293,137	19,434
Activities	61,016				62,851	165
			June 1972			
Total DoD	5,994,922	2,322,339	924,657	1,570,581	1.067,506	189,939
	2,939,671 1,280,097	810,649 587,817	622.731 124.098	1,059,909 215,478	367,355 341,543	79,027
Marine Corps Air Force	1,280,097 377,183 1,337,155	198,238 725,635	40,736	215,478 138,214 156,980		
Other Defense Activities	60,811				60,715	96
	5075011	30	June 1973		00,770	
	E 100 CS1			1 200 741		101.949
Total DoD Army	5,499,621 2,585,861	2,251,928 800,523 564,308	918,970 621,099	1,228,741 758,708 217,269	998,033 333,235	77,296
Navy Marine Corps	1,241,766	564.308 196.098	126,206 37,509	217,269 115,957	321,765	
Air Force Other Defense	1,249,498	690,999	134,156	136.807	270,484	17.052
Activities	72,932				72,549	
			June 1974			
Total DoD	5,127,126	2,161,162	926.148	931.322	1,014,014	94,480
Army Navy	2,370,591 1,174,583	782,897 545,668	638,262 114,864	540,782 178,904	342,191 323,556	66,459 11,591
Marine Corps Air Force	311,264 1,195,403	188,302 643,795	32,800 140,222	89,662 121,974	273,596	15,816
Other Defense Activities	75,285		140,000		74,671	614
			June 1975			
Total DoD	4,891,846	2,129,027	906,866	763,900	994,367	97,686
Army Navy	2.186,488	785.000	612,400 112,790		336,760	69,328
Marine Corps Air Force	307,376 1,146,376	536,117 196,376 611,534	34,000	197,900 77,000 106,000	265,578	
Other Defense		011.334	147.676	110012000		
Activities	74,504		June 1976		73,755	749
Total DoD	4,747,533	2,099,954	886,184	680,900		95,495
Army Navy	2,119,190	785,000 528,651	612,400 92,000	320,000 197,900	334,133 322,067	67.657 11.706
Marine Corp	1,152,324 301,303	196,303	34,000	71,000		
Air Force Other Defense	1,101,052	590,000	147,784	92,000	255,904	15,364
Activities	73,664		eptember 1976		72,896	768
	4 770 700			500.000	991,441	96.496
Total DoD Army	4,770,795 2,131,847	2,115,358 793,000	886,600 612,400 92,000	680,900 320,000 197,900	337.787 322.883	68,660
Navy Marine Corps	1,160,349 301,498	535,860 196,498	92.000 14.000			11,706
Air Force Other Defense	1,103,387	590,000	148,200		257,825	15,362
Activities	73,714				77,946	768
			September 1977			
Total DoD	4,771,377	2,126,651	888,142	663,900	994,494	98,190
Army Navy	2,125,055 1,176,085	793,000 546,005	612,400 92,000	312,000 197,900	137,295 328,474	70,360 11,206
Marine Corps	302,646 1,003,803	197,646 590,000	34,000 149,742	71,000 83,000	255,699	15,362
Air Force Other Defense		270,000			73,026	762
Activities	73,788				13,000	

<sup>1/</sup> Active duty military fY64-74 are actuals as reported in the President's Buddets. FY25-77 data are from the Budget for FY76 and the FY76 Authorization Bill Request. Data include reimbursable personnel. Not included are personnel on active duty but paid from Civil works or Reserve Components appropriations.

2/ Civilian personnel data are military functions only. Youth Programs are excluded except for FX65-68 for which no data are available. National Guard Technicians were converted from State to Federal employees in FY69. FY64-68 data have been adjusted to include Technicians as civilian employees for comparability.

TABLE 2. COMPUTATION OF SEA INCREMENT (Active Military Strengths in 000s)

	FY 64	FY 64 FY 65	FY 66	FY 67	FY 68	FY 69	FY 70	FY 71	FY 72	FY 73	FY 74	FY 75	FY 76	FY 7T	FY 77
Pacific Theater Strengths	252	298	534	744	874	854	969	462	287	210 172 173	172	173	191	191	161
Change from FY 64	0	+46	+282	+492	+622		+443	+210	+35	-42	-80	-79	16- 16- 6	-91	-91
United States Strength	1,932 1,877	1,877	2,081		2,307	2,264	1,997	1,880	1,695	1,673 1,	1,643	1,643 1,616 1,597	1,597	1,612	1,612
Change from FY 64	0	-55	+149	+198	+375	+332	+65	-52							
Total DoD Strength	2,685	2,653	3,092	3,37	,54	3,459	990,	2,714	2,32	,252	,161	2,129	2,100	2,115	2,127
Adjustment for SEA	0	0	-431	69-	-99	-934	-508	-158							
Adjusted DoD Strength	2,685	2,653	2,661		2,550	2,525	2,558	2,556	2,322	2,252	2,161	2,129	2,100	2,115	2,127

TABLE 3. DOD MANPOWER BY MAJOR DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORY, FY 64-FY 77 (000s)

FY 77	2,134 103 103 151 1183 39 123 287 1,799 335	890 567 66 399 18 47 47 40 856 856	1,093 10 10 44 15 24 117 228 654
FY 7T	2,119 102 102 103 103 126 289 289 1,788 1,788	888 16 561 66 39 47 18 18 858 30	1,088 10 10 142 142 142 117 229 651
FY 76	2,100 559 169 173 39 127 289 289 1,791	888 16 16 66 39 139 33 855	1,081 11 42 42 15 24 229 644
FY 75	2,129 110 529 170 174 40 299 299 343 1,803	906 15 563 70 70 45 45 47 878 878	1,092 12 43 43 14 123 123 227 650
FY 74	2,161 121 495 163 173 173 173 306 365 1,816 345	926 20 20 586 68 68 54 77 17 76	1,109 15 14 13 125 225 665
FY 73	2,252 125 125 165 190 43 43 161 340 391 1,926	928 22 269 76 39 39 896 896	1,114 16 339 14 25 140 235 645
FY 72	2,322 129 460 176 195 179 355 404 1,948	926 866 890 890 890 890 890 890 890 890 890 890	1,174 16 53 13 27 27 135 251 679
FY 71	2,714 132 633 175 207 60 212 387 738 2,543	979 118 177 172 929 929	1,205 15 15 12 139 139 698
FY 70	3,066 741 741 197 237 69 220 424 788 2,819	987 574 73 73 91 70 914	1,280 17 17 65 14 3 2 30 143 742
FY 69	3,459 167 873 209 293 74 233 3,231 229	960 255 632 633 490 490 775 922 388	1,406 19 72 111 7 32 302 811
FY 68	3,547 176 889 212 290 227 477 477 930 3,282	929 255 591 553 881 87 71 916	1,409 18 64 8 34 154 320 809
FY 67	3,377 186 852 188 297 71 223 492 828 3,136	983 633 633 750 880 880 880 890 890	1,413 17 70 9 3 37 154 307
FY 66	3,092 178 673 175 289 71 211 506 882 2,983	969 24 595 62 62 98 93 18 18 40	1,275 16 30 30 9 4 145 276 767
FY 65	2,655 196 607 152 246 53 204 473 647 2,578	932 255 880 54 98 98 62 890 890	1,168 15,30 8 8 8 22,4 142,2551
FY 64	2,685 221 606 142 248 248 193 496 640 2,601 84	954 26 556 49 47 47 872 872 872 872	1,187 16 35 8 8 8 140 267 692
	Active Military Total Strategic Forces Land Forces Tactical Air Forces Naval Forces Mobility Forces Auxiliary Forces Mission Support Forces Central Support Forces Total Forces	Selected Reserve Total Strategic Forces Land Forces Tactical Air Forces Naval Forces Mobility Forces Auxiliary Forces Mission Support Forces Total Forces Individuals	Civilians (Direct & Indirect Hire)  Strategic Forces Land Forces Tactical Air Forces Naval Forces Mobility Forces Auxiliary Forces Auxiliary Forces Central Support Forces

\*Less than 500. NOTE: Detail may not add to totals because of rounding. Sources: FY 64-73, FYDP Resource Reports-Historical (OASD-PARE) May 74; FY 74-77, Manpower Requirements Report, Feb 75.

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TABLE 4. TALIOR MISSION FORCES MANDOWER, FY 64-FY (000s)
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	FY 77	103	1 1 1 2 2	561 44 1,166	\$ 0 E		E 22 2 2	8779		E . E	\$ 9 9 K		8849	9708
	FY 71	202 982	135 6 4 9 6	58.7 86.1 1.160	49 + 40 E		769 759 759	5759		E. 86	5 0 0 E		3.9 2.4 0.0 0.0	4778
	FY 76	102	134	259 42 561 1,162	4.00		75	5+515		E. #6	1,00k		e 4.45	#77R
	FY 75	137	= 4 = 5	529 43 563 1,135	12.4.4.18		0.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0	2 + 5   5		2, 28,	747		8228	277K
	FY 74	121 15 156	-100 -1- -107-	495 495 1,122	-11 +64 -41		52.4.25	2.400		54	£°48		4254	= 0.00
	F¥ 73	£ 2 8 8 £	-96 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0	512 39 569 1,120	44.4		165 76 265	SAPR.		190	80079		25.50	2999
	FY 72	129 164	26-	460 53 1,079	14 4 4 8 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4		258	# 4 5 E		2.88	20 4 6		22.22	2425
	FY 71	132	5 - 8 8	633 54 591 1.278	5 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6			5498		8. ale	4 0 4 14		0 5 0 5	4444
(5000	F V 70		£ + 1 8	741 66 674 1,380	· 135 · 527 • 577	Air For	28.2 28.2	9778	Forces	おで見	F29F	y Forces		÷
	69 A	167 19 35 221	+3 +3 +42	Land 873 72 582 1,527	+267 +354 +364	Tactical	2=02	4 1 2 3	Saval	2/8/8	\$ 5 - 0   5 -	Mobility	74 32 45 155	\$ 7 7 B
	200	176 18 35 229	84.00	88.9 64 1,544	283 200 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400			5046			54 ± 8155		8428	ži. i Š
	79 1.1	186 17 34 237	岩土山岩	852 70 762 1,484	\$ 5 5 E		E' 38	å <u>+ </u> <u>+</u> <u>+</u> <u> </u> <u>6</u>		E 88	275		72 337	2118
	00	228 34 228 228	2048	23.88	\$15 P		5.08	7-77		夏•寒晨	40-14			÷ + 55
23 63	0	196 15 35 246	\$7.9E	28 8 E	2444		Bask	South		8.88			35.02	TTTT
EN 63		263		8 4 3 12			9.48			¥.86			8598	
		STRENGTHS Active Miltary Chvilian Selected Reserve Total	CHANGES FROM 19 64 Active Military Civilian Selected Reserve Total	SFERGIBS Active Nilitary CWillian Solected Reserve Total	CHANGES FROM FY 64 Active Military Civilian Selected Reserve Total		STRENGISS Active Military Chyllian Selected Reserve Total	CHANGES FROM IN 64 Active Military Civilian Salected Reserve Total		STREAGHS Active Military Civilian Selected Reserve Total	CHANGE FROM FY 64 Active Military Civilian Selected Reserve Total		STREATHS Active Military Clvillan Selected Reserves Total	OHANGES FROM FY 64 Active Military Civilian Selected Reserve Total

DOD ACTIVE MILITARY MANPOWER BY DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORY, FY 64-FY 77 (Categories as Percent of Total) TABLE 5.

FY 77	100.0	0.00	5.8	13.5	15.7		26.1 94.8 5.2
FY 71	100.0	88.0	1.8	13.7	84.3		25.9 94.5 5.5
FY 76	100.0	0.00	6.0	13.8	85.3		24.6 94.0 6.0
FY 75	100.0	88.00	1.9	14.0	84.7		25.4 94.1 5.9
FY 74	100.0	7.5	7.0	14.2	16.0		28.7 95.8 4.2
FY 73	100.0	7.3	7.9	15.1	85.5	72-77	26.1 94.2 5.8
FY 72	100.0	7.6	2.2	15.3	83.9	port FY	28.0 94.5 5.5
FY 71	100.0	6.4	2.2	14.3	6.3	Central Sup	27.2 93.7 6.3
FY 70	100.0	6.4	2.3	13.8	92.0	in .	25.7 92.0 8.0
FY 69	100.0	8.50	2.1	13.7	93.4	Students	26.3 93.4 6.6
FY 68	100.0	8.2	2.3	13.4	92.5	ainees &	26.2 92.5 7.5
FY 67	100.0	3 6 80	2.1	14.6	92.9	with Tr	24.5 92.9 7.1
FY 66	100.0	5.7	2.3	16.3	3.6	d Series	28.5 96.4 3.6
FY 65	100.0	5.7	2.0	17.8	97.1	Revise	24.4 97.1 2.9
FY 64	100.0	5.3	2.0	18.5	96.9		23.8 96.9 3.1
	Strategic Forces	Tactical Air Forces Naval Forces	Mobility Forces Auxiliary Forces	Mission Support Forces Central Support Forces	Total Forces Individuals		Central Support Forces Total Forces Individuals

NOTE: Detail may not add to totals because of rounding.

